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Abstract
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1. Introduction
In any monetary union there will be differences between regions in terms of economic
performance.  Should the monetary authority react to these divergences?  For Europe, i.e. the
euro area, the standard answer is no: The ECB is held responsible for the average performance
of the entire euro zone.  However, as in some countries the performance starts to diverge
considerably from the average this answer appears superficial.  It is not satisfactory because it
does not take into account that the EU was created to serve the interests of its member states,
which remain the basic political units in Europe.  This differentiates the euro area from nation
states, even very federally organised ones, in which the main political unit coincides with the
monetary union.  Therefore, countries which differ largely from the average would not be
served appropriately by such a policy.
The issue of what should be the political unit whose welfare should be taken into account
by the ECB is important because welfare is usually assumed to be a convex function of
economic performance.  To use a concrete example:  imagine a monetary union of two
regions/countries of equal size.  If one assumes, as usual, that the welfare of each
region/country is a quadratic function of one variable, say unemployment, the average welfare
of the two regions will fall as the standard deviation increases (for any given mean).  If
(national) welfare loss = (unemployment)
2 and if the two countries have unemployment rates
equal to +d and –d (so that the average is always equal to zero) the average welfare loss is
equal to d
2.
Average welfare losses thus increase with the dispersion of unemployment.  But in a
monetary union it is impossible to have a nationally differentiated monetary policy.  One is thus
tempted to conclude that the ECB might bemoan national divergences within the euro area, but
that there is nothing it could or should do about them.  This conclusion is, however, rash if one
admits that monetary policy involves, at least in the short run, a trade-off between two policy
goals; e.g. inflation and employment.  In this case very high national unemployment rates enter
the objective function with a de facto higher weight because they are squared. Referring to the
current problems the question is thus whether the unemployment rate of Spain (which during2
the year 2000 will be about one-half higher than the euro area average) should be considered
just as one element in the calculation of the average area-wide unemployment or whether one
should consider the high welfare losses it causes in Sapiin separately.  The situation in Spain
would presumably affect decisions by the ECB much more under the second approach.
The deeper issue is thus what should the ECB do when one size clearly does not fit all?
Should it base its decisions on the area-wide averages of inflation and unemployment, or
should it attempt to minimise the (weighted) average of national welfare losses resulting from
actual national inflation and unemployment rates?  In this short paper, we aim to provide a first
step towards an answer by showing to what extend these two choices would lead to different
policies in a world where the preferences regarding inflation are identical, but where there are
differences in the monetary transition mechanism.
We thus go beyond the existing literature, where it is usually assumed that the common
central bank bases its decision only on union wide state variables (Alesina and Grilli 1992).
The literature on central bank constitutions for monetary unions, in contrast, assumes the same
for the centrally appointed members of the decision making body whereas the representatives
appointed by the constituting regions of the monetary union are assumed to look only at the
welfare losses of their home region (von Hagen and Süppel 1994, de Grauwe, Dewachter and
Aksoy 1999).  Both strands of the existing literature thus to not deal with the problem
discussed here, namely how a homogenous body of decision makers in the ECB council should
set monetary policy.
The remainder of this note is organised as follows:  The next section presents the model
used for the analysis.  Purposely, we use a standard model because we want to draw attention
to the general point that there is a difference between area-wide welfare based on the
(weighted) area-wide averages of national performances and the average area-wide welfare
based on (also weighted) national welfare, which arises in the standard approach but has been
neglected so far.  Section 3 calculates the policy resulting under both choices (in the form of
reaction functions), while section 4 draws welfare conclusions.  Section 5 concludes.3
2. The model
We use a standard model, based on the usual two building blocks, a labour demand
function (or an output supply function) and a welfare function defined over inflation and
employment (or output).  We assume that there are j=1..N member countries in the monetary
union.
Labour demand in country j is given as
( ) EU j
e
j j j j n e + e + p - p a = , (1)
where e j is a pure national shock with  ( ) 0 E = e  and  ( )
2 2
j j E e s = e . As the  j e 's represent national
asymmetric shocks we assume that the covariances among them are equal to zero.  To the
extent that the national shocks are correlated their covariance should show up in a higher
variance of the common shock  EU e .  The latter thus captures truly common shocks plus any
covariance among national shocks.
The parameter a j measures the employment effects of monetary policy in country j. There is,
in addition, an area wide common shock  EU e  with  ( ) 0 E EU = e  and  ( )
2 2
EU EU E e s = e  that affects
all countries equally.  It could best be thought of as a world-wide commodity shock, a global
recession, or the external exchange rate.  We assume that the common shock is not correlated
to national shocks  ( ) 0 E EU j = e e .
Preferences of the (welfare maximising) authorities are formulated as a loss function
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1 t j L E  where L j t ,  is the per period loss function.  Because all periods are ex-
ante identical we drop the time index and are only interested in the current loss, which is
specified (all variables are expressed as logs) in the usual way:
( )
2
j
2
j j j k n b L p + - = , (2)
where b is the relative weight country j puts on the employment aim,  j k  expresses the level of
distortions on the labour market which keep employment below its full employment level4
(Barro and Gordon 1983, Rogoff 1985).  As usual it is assumed that employment is below its
potential due to the influence of strong labour unions that use their power to push wages above
the market clearing level.  If labour unions are characterised by a separation into insiders and
outsiders, the former will set wages too high for full employment. Unemployed outsiders have
no influence on wage setting.
All of this is standard, and so is the problem for the monetary authority, namely to
minimise the one period loss.  We emphasise that the parameter b does not have a subscript
because we assume that preferences (i.e. inflation aversion) are identical in all countries as we
want to see whether divergences in national performance should influence the decisions of the
ECB even if preferences are identical.
3. Monetary policy
We now proceed to calculate the optimal monetary policy under two different
assumptions about the objective of the ECB.  It could either minimise the (weighted ) average
of national losses, or alternatively minimise the loss function calculated at the euro area level,
using the (weighted) averages of national inflation rates and output gaps as input.
3.1. Minimising national welfare losses
The union monetary authority maximises the weighted average of national utilities.  This
leads to the following programme:
Minimise  ( ) [ ] ￿ p + - m =
j
2 2
j j j k n b L , (3)
where the relative weight of country j is  j m , with  1
j
j = m ￿ .  In equation (3) we have already
used the fact that in our one good model inflation is the same all over the monetary union.
This implies that our model cannot replicate one of the problems facing the ECB, namely
divergences in national inflation rates.  Different national inflation rates could e.g. arise in a
model with non-tradables and tradables.  We abstract from this complication, however.5
Using (1) in (3) and minimising this expression with respect to the (common) rate of
inflation, the first order condition is :
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The expected rate of inflation is thus  j j
j
j
e k b a m = p ￿ .  We can now calculate the actual
rate of inflation in the standard way by using this result in equation (4).
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For convenience we define a new aggregate shock which consists of the sum of the
common shock  EU e  and the average national shock ￿ e m
j
j j :  ￿ e m + e ” x
j
j j EU .  To simplify
notation, we further define an average a:  a ” a m ￿
j
j j .
Solving for the rate of inflation yields us
x
a m +
a
- a m = p
￿ ￿
j
2
j j
j
j
j j
N
b 1
b
k b .
(4)
where the superscript N denotes the case of monetary policy based on national welfare.
Inflation is increasing in the size of the distortion in all member economies (the inflation bias)
and in response to a common shock.
3.2. Minimising area-wide welfare losses based on national performance
Alternatively, the ECB might base its decision on an area-wide utility function which
uses the averages of national rates of employment and inflation as input.  The problem then
becomes:6
Minimise  ( ) [ ]
2 2
j j j j k n b L p + - m = ￿ , (5)
Substituting into equation (1) for employment, this becomes
( ) [ ]
2 2
j j j j j j j j
e
j j j k b L p + m - x m + e m + p - p a m = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,
Differentiating this expression with respect to the rate of inflation, gives the first-order
condition
( ) [ ] 0 2 k b 2 L e = p + - x + p - p a a =
p ¶
¶
where we have used again the fact that  1
j j = m ￿ , the definition of x , and introduced the
notation ￿ ” m
j
j j k k .  In this case,  k b
e a = p , so that the rate of inflation set by the ECB
becomes
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(6)
with  0
A > W  and where the superscript A denotes the case of monetary policy being tailored
to area wage averages of national performances.  Inflation is again increasing in the average
size of the distortion in the member economies (the inflation bias) and in response to a
common shock.
3.3. A comparison of inflation rates
In the next step, we explore what influence the difference in the objective function of the
central bank in the two alternative cases would have.  Comparing equation (4) and (6) reveals
that the difference between the two solutions stems from two sources:  First the inflation bias,7
resulting from the aggregation of national distortions, is different in the two cases.  However,
the terms  k a  and  j
j
j j k ￿ a m  are linked through the relation between the  j a 's and the  j k 's:
j
j
j j k ￿ a m k k , a + q = a .1  The second difference in the two solutions, the term denoting the
reaction of the common monetary policy to the common shock lies in the difference between
the terms 
2
ba  and ￿ a m
j
2
j j b .  They are linked by:  ￿ a m
j
2
j j b = ( )
2 2 b a + qa .2
With this notation, the rate of inflation, when the central bank cares about national
welfare, can be rewritten
( ) ( )
( ) x W - a + q ” x
a + q +
a
- a + q = p a
a
a
N
k , 2 2
k ,
N k b
b 1
b
k b
(4')
with  0
N > W , whereas in the alternative case it does not change and remains as derived in (6).
Comparing equations (4') and (6) shows that 
A N W < W  for a positive 
2
a q .  Given these
results, we can compare the rates of inflation in the two cases
( ) ( )( )
x
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a q
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a
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a
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b
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2 2 2
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k ,
A N (7)
It is thus not possible to say whether a central bank which addresses its policy to national
objectives will produce a higher inflation bias.  This will be the case only if there is a positive
relation between the effectiveness of monetary policy and the level of distortions  0 k , > qa .3
                                               
1 Define  ( )( ) k , j j j j k k a q ” - a - a m ￿  and multiply this out to see that  j
j
j j k ￿ a m
k k , a + q = a .
2 Define  ( )
2 2
j j j a q ” a - a m ￿ .  Multiply out this expression and notice that
a a m - ￿ j j j 2
2 2
j j a - = a m +￿ .  Thus ￿ a + q = a m a j
2 2 2
j j .
3 See the appendix for an example in which the relation between  j a  and  j k  is explicitly
derived.8
However, a central bank that minimises (the average of national) welfare losses will in general
stabilise aggregate shocks less (the second term being positive).  The overall effect on the rate
of inflation is thus indeterminate.
The intuition behind the result that the rate of inflation is higher under the national
welfare maximising monetary regime--if there is a positive relation between the two key
parameters, the effectiveness of monetary policy and labour market distortions--is the
following: The more effective monetary policy is (a high a) the lower the marginal costs of
using monetary policy.  If in this situation, distortions (k) are also high, the central bank as a
higher incentive to use active monetary policy.  This problem is magnified by the fact that the
central bank cares for national welfare instead of averages.  In this case, countries with a high
level of distortions are strongly taken into account.  Given that this is known to rational private
agents, the expected rate of inflation increases, hence a higher inflation bias results.  If, on the
other hand, a and k are negatively related, the result is reversed and the inflation bias is lower.
The central bank will also take into account that the impact of monetary policy differs in
the member countries, according to the size of the variance of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.  This implies that for some countries much less monetary policy is necessary to
stabilise shocks whereas for others more would be needed.  But since only one common
monetary policy can be set, the central bank is required to balance these influences, leading in
the end to the result that common shocks are stabilised less because a stronger reaction would
hurt some countries more than they would gain.  In other words, the ECB becomes more
cautious in using monetary policy to stabilise shocks.
As differences in the transmission mechanism play a key role in our results, the questions
thus arises how important these are in reality.  The literature on this point is difficult to
interpret because the underlying question has usually been different from ours.  Some maintain
the differences in the transmission mechanism are so large that they will make the operation of
EMU difficult (Cechetti 1999).  Others argue that these differences are due to differences in
financial structures, which will diminish over time as countries share a common monetary
policy (Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi 1998).  Most empirical studies concur, however, that9
at present there are still large differences in the transmission mechanism, although they are
difficult to estimate precisely (see e.g. Borio 1995, Gerlach and Smets 1995). Table 1 reports
the estimates from Cechetti 1999, which suggest that the differences in the output multiplier
are considerable.  The highest coefficient is over 3 times larger than the lowest.  There is thus
some evidence that differences in the transmission mechanisms are large.
4. A welfare comparison
Having derived the difference in inflation and in the stabilisation of shocks under the two
alternative objective functions for the common central bank, it remains to be seen what welfare
implications this would have.
Given that the comparison of welfare under the alternative regime should be done on an
ex-ante basis, we concentrate on expected welfare losses.  We start with an evaluation of the
average welfare of all union members.  In the case that the common central bank cares for
averages, we have expected losses for the entire union of (after using equation (1) to substitute
out for employment):
[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ￿ p + - e + x + x W a m =
j
2 A 2
j j A j j
A k b E L E (8)
which can be rewritten, by multiplying out the quadratic terms as
[ ] ( ) ( )
2 A 2 2 2 2 2
A j j j
A k b k b b 1 b L E x e x s W + a + + s + s W a - m = ￿
where the last terms, the variance of the aggregate common shock, can be written as
( ) N E
EU /
2 2 2
e e s s x + =  if all countries are of equal size, and the number of countries is
indicated by N.  For a sufficient large number of member countries the variance of the
aggregate common shock will thus be dominated by its area-wide component.
Likewise, the expected loss under the alternative is
[ ] ( ) ( )
2 N 2
k ,
2 2 2 2 2
N j j j
N k b k b b 1 b L E x a e x s W + a + q + + s + s W a - m = ￿
(9)10
The difference is thus given as
[ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] { }
[ ] k , k ,
2
2 2
N
2
N j j j
2
A
2
A j j j
N A
k b
b 1 1 L E L E
a a
x
q + a s -
s W + W a - m - W + W a - m = - ￿ ￿ (10)
On average the members of the monetary union can be thus better off under a common
central bank which minimises national welfare losses, as the first term in (10) is positive given
that  
A N W < W .  This first result is not surprising: the average of national welfare losses should
be lower under a central bank that explicitly attempts to minimise them than under a central
bank that does not.  What is not so evident is that the gain from having the ECB look at
national losses is increasing in the variance of the common shock 
2
x s .  As we have already
argued above, this reflects the fact that ECB now takes into account that different countries
have a different need for active monetary policy in reaction to a common shock.  It will
therefore stabilise less which is beneficial for any single country.  Obviously, the gain from this
regime is thus larger the higher the variance of the common shock.  The effect is strengthened
if the (common) dispersion of the  j a 's increases.  This can be seen by rewriting (10), by using
the definitions made above, as
[ ] [ ] ( )( )( ) { }
[ ] k , k ,
2
2
N A
2 2
N A
N A
k b
b 2 1 L E L E
a a
x a
q + a q -
s a - W + W a + q + W - W = -
The second term expresses the fact that the inflation bias might be higher whenever the
central bank cares of national welfare rather than average welfare.  This is the case if the
relation between the effectiveness of monetary policy and distortions is positive.  As argued
above, in this situation the central bank has a higher incentive to use active monetary policy,
thus pushing up the expected rate of inflation.  If, on the other hand,  0 k , < qa  the result is
reversed and countries are clearly better off under a central bank that maximises national
welfare.11
However, even if union member countries are on average better off under a common
central bank that looks at national welfare, this does not necessarily imply that every country is
better off in this situation.
Dropping the summation in (10), the welfare comparison for any single country yields:
[ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] { }
[ ] k ,
2
k ,
2
2 2
N
2
N j
2
A
2
A j
N
j
A
j
k 2 b
b 1 1 L E L E
a a
x
q + a q -
s W + W a - - W + W a - = - (11)
For any individual country, the welfare difference under two policy options for the
common central bank remains thus the sum of the differences in the inflation bias and the
stabilisation to common shocks.  The inflation bias term is unchanged, and remains, as
discussed above, a function of the relation  k , a q .  Given that we do not have any information
about this relation, except for our very special example in the appendix, it seems more
promising to focus on the stabilisation role of monetary policy and ask how the transmission
mechanism determines under which regime a country would fare better.  We thus set  0 k , = qa
and focus on the first term in (11).
Obviously, this is a function of  j a  only.  We begin by setting  0 j = a , in which case the
first term would clearly be positive given that  N A W > W .  The country would hence gain if the
central bank would care for national welfare.  Since monetary policy in this country is assumed
to be ineffective ( 0 j = a ) it loses from an active monetary policy because inflation variability
would increase without any gain in terms of lower output variability.  Thus, the less the
common central bank stabilises the better it is for such a country.  The same is true if  ¥ ﬁ a j
because then the first term would also be clearly positive.  In this case monetary policy would
be supereffective and the country would also prefer a less stabilising central bank as moderate
monetary policy would be sufficient.  Otherwise, output variability would increase by too much
for this country.
Hence, the regime preferred by country j is a non-linear function of its own  j a .  To
derive the critical  j
~ a  at which the country would just be indifferent with respect to the12
objectives of the common central, we set the first term in (11) equal to zero so that
( )
2
A
2
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2
N
2
N j 1 W + W a - .  The critical  j
~ a  is thus implicitly determined by:
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There are hence two solution for  j
~ a  that fulfil this condition (see Figure 1).  To find the
maximum of the function  ( )
2
j j
~ 1 / ~ a + a , we set  ( ) [ ]
j
2
j j
~
~ 1 / ~
a ¶
a + a ¶
= 
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2 2
j
2
j
~ 1
~ 1
a +
a -
 equal to zero.  This is
the case at  j
~ a =1, which thus determines the maximum of the RHS of equation (12) function.
5. Concluding remarks
We have found that it makes a difference whether the central bank of a monetary union
bases its decisions on the average values of inflation and employment for the entire area, or
whether it recognises that differences in national performance can lead potentially to large
differences in national welfare and therefore tries to minimise the average of national welfare.
If it minimises the (weighted) average of national welfare it will react less to common shocks
than a central bank concerned with union wide developments would do.  It might also produce
a higher inflation bias, however, depending on the relation between the transmission
mechanism and labour market distortions across member countries.  It is thus not possible to
say which policy orientation leads to lower average welfare.  Countries with a transmission
mechanism close to the average will prefer a central bank that looks only at area-wide averages
of inflation and employment.
Proceeding independently De Grauwe (2000) addresses the same question.  With a two
country model he arrives at similar conclusions using a series of simulations.  Our more general
formulation allows us to derive general analytical results in a multi-country setting.
It is worthwhile to emphasise that our results are completely independent from two
issues that usually come up in any discussion of national divergences within EMU.  First,
whether and how the ECB should weigh the variables from member countries when it13
calculates area-wide averages (i.e. population or GDP weights).  And second, whether
different countries have different preferences concerning the trade off between output and
inflation, an issue that much dominated public discussion in countries like Germany.  We have
explicitly assumed that preferences are the same in all countries, reflecting the evidence that
preferences on this seem to have converged over the last decades (Collins and Giavazzi 1993,
Hayo 1998).
Another, somewhat deeper, issue that remains unresolved in our view is that of the
foundation of the aggregate welfare functions used in most policy analysis.  The basis for a
national welfare function is usually the assumption that all agents within one country are in the
same situation so that one can think of a country as being populated by one representative
agent.  This assumption becomes probably even more problematic, than it is already in the
standard national context, when one considers the euro area because the euro area is even
more heterogeneous than even large member countries.  Moreover, at the national level
preferences can be mediated via a single integrated political system.  This is much less the case
in the EU, which does not constitute a political union.14
Appendix 1: An example for the relation between  j a  and  j k
In this appendix we derive the connection between distortions and the transmission
mechanism explicitly.  We begin with labour demand and the endogenous amount of distortion
in the labour market.  The productive sector in each country is represented by a Cobb-Douglas
technology 
g g - = j
1
j j N K Y ,  [ ] g ˛ 01 , , where the capital stock K is constant and normalised to
one. Labour N is employed by profit maximising firms to the point where its marginal
productivity is equal to the real wage 
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where Wi and Pi  denote the national
wage and price levels respectively. We normalise  1 P 1 , j = - . Lower case letters denote natural
logarithms and parameters are constant and positive. p denotes inflation and therefore the
logarithm of the current price level.  Taking natural logs, labour demand becomes
( ) ( ) j j j j j j j w n w
1
1
ln n p - a - ” p -
- g
+ g - =
 
where  j n  is the full employment level.  Thus,
labour demand is falling in real wages, resulting in employment below full employment.  We
assume that labour is supplied inelastically.  Hence the level of employment is determined by
the labour demand schedule.  Note that we assumed that the reaction of labour demand to real
wages is the same as the slope of the Phillips-curve  j a .
Next we assume that preferences of all national labour union members are identical, and
since firms produce a homogenous good, this allows us to represent them by a single union
that covers the whole country and maximises the objectives of a representative union member.
His or her objectives are given over real wages ( ) j j w p -  and a deviation of employment from
full employment ( )
2
j j n n - .
Our assumptions are reflected in the following utility function for the labour union in
country j  ( ) ( )
2
j j j j j j n n
2
1
w U - - p - b = .  b j measures the degree of union aggressiveness
that is, for instance, determined by the influence of the group of insiders in the labour union
(Lindbeck and Snower 1988).  Given this utility function, we can derive the wage demand of15
the labour union by maximising this function with respect to wj as 
2
j
j
j w
a
b
+ p = , leading to an
employment level of 
j
j
j j n n
a
b
- = .
Next we use this setup to show that one can also directly link the  j a 's and  j k 's.  Thus,
we explicitly relate the efficiency of monetary policy in country j  j a  with the level of distortion
in country j  j k .  We define  j j j n n k - =  and normalise the (log of ) full employment level to
zero to have finally  j j jk b = a  which inversely relates the slope of the Phillips-curve to the
level of distortions in each country.
Intuitively this can be understood as follows: Assume e.g. that the distortions which are
responsible for the fact the output is below its potential are due to distortions in the labour
market.  The power of labour unions pushes the wage level above its market clearing level; as a
consequence employment is lowered.  The level of distortions must be considered as
endogenous because it is due to the influence of labour unions, and the latter will take into
account how monetary policy affects output.  The more monetary policy can achieve in
stimulating output, the less incentives there are to avoid distortions.  Thus, the endogenous
determined amount of distortions in an economy is inversely related to the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
We presented this bare bones model only as an example.  Different specifications of what
distortions cause a difference between desired and equilibrium output might come to different
results.  The general point we wanted to make is simply that one should not consider the slope
of the short run Philips to be independent from these distortions.16
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Table 1. Differences in the Transmission Mechanism
Country Impact on Output of a 1-Percent Increase in
Interest Rates (absolute changes)
EMU-Members
Belgium 0.72
France 1.30
Germany 1.21
Ireland 0.76
Italy 0.64
Portugal 0.39
Spain 0.46
EMU-Nonmembers
Denmark 0.48
Sweden 0.56
United Kingdom 0.53
Source: Cechetti 1999.j ~ a
R
+
2
A N W + W
1
Figure 1
2
j
j
~ 1
~
a +
a